

LogiCCC Prague 2008



Formal methods in the Philosophy of Science

Jan-Willem Romeijn Faculty of Philosophy University of Groningen

ESF initiative: The architecture of science



Team A: Formal methods

Formal philosophy of science


- Formal methods can clarify the practice of scientists and provide norms for good practice.
- Good-old logic is no longer the toolkit of choice for philosophers of science.
- Logic has seen major extensions and revisions in recent years.
- High time for bringing logic back to the scene.

Outline of talk

- The demise of logical methods
- New methods: confirmation
- New methods: statistics
- New methods: uncertainty
- Logic meets philosophy, again

• The demise of logic

In early day philosophy of science, logical analysis played a key role, especially in confirmation theory.



Popper



Carnap




Hempel

0

The poverty of syntax


The logical analysis ran into a number of paradoxes.



The bottom line was that traditional logic cannot cope with the complexity, or with the semantic aspects of scientific modeling.

New methods: confirmation


Philosophers of science traditionally used classical deductive logic to capture confirmation.





Bayesian confirmation

Instead of truth valuations, we can also use a probability measure over an algebra to express confirmation.



$$P(H) = P(\neg H)$$

$$P(H|E) > P(\neg H|E)$$

$$P(E \mid \neg H) < P(E \mid H) = 1$$

Using new logics?


2

Confirmation theory can be improved in various ways:

- Scientific models often concern causal relations.
 Causal hypotheses invite different confirmations.
- Issues are sometimes decided by the scientific forum, by voting or by consensus formation.
- In many instances of confirmation, logical and probabilistic knowledge must be combined.

New methods: statistics


Causal networks and Bayesian methods are having increasing impact on statistics in the social sciences.



8


Integrating logic and statistics

Often we also have logical constraints on parameters and interactions in the statistical model. How can we integrate the two?



4 New methods: uncertainty

Additive normed measures are not the only tool for representing epistemic uncertainty.



uncertain evidential bearing:

$$^{1}/_{4} < P(E \mid \neg H) < ^{1}/_{2}$$

uncertain about the evidence:

$$P(E) > P(\neg E)$$

4

Models of agents

Alternative representations of uncertainty can be used in methodology, but also in scientific modeling itself.

- The uncertainty of economic agents and psychological subjects are perhaps better represented with other measures than probability.
- Different representations of uncertainty might mesh better with new models of how agents interact, e.g., alternatives to decision and game theory.

6 Logic meets philosophy, again

- ☆ Logic can provide new tools for the philosophy of science.
- ☆ We must be careful to give priority to the sciences, not to what tools happen to be around.
- ☆ To convince scientists of new methods, we need a killer application.



Thanks

- j.w.romeijn@rug.nl
- http://www.philos.rug.nl/~romeyn
- J.W. Romeijn
 University of Groningen / Philosophy
 Oude Boteringestraat 52,
 9712 GL Groningen
 The Netherlands